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Introduction
Often government behaviour is considered to be exogenous in economic modelling. However, there exists no reason why government behaviour should not be explained, while behaviour of other agents acting in the economy is endogenously determined. The influence of the government on for example minimum wages is substantial and the existence of minimum wages clearly influences economic behaviour of producers and consumers. Moreover, the producers and consumers influence the level of the minimum wages by voting or by forming pressure groups. For example high levels of unemployment might increase the pressure on government to lower minimum wages. Hence, in order to explain the existence of minimum wages and to give an analysis of the most important determinants of the level of minimum wages, government behaviour should be modelled endogenously. The existence of minimum wages is just one example of a price rigidity. Other examples are price controls to reduce inflation (see Cox [8] ), minimum prices for agricul-* The author would like to thank Dolf Talman, Pieter Ruys, Jan van Geldrop, and an anonymous referee for their valuable comments on previous drafts of this paper. The author is financially supported by the Cooperation Centre Tilburg and Eindhoven Universities, The Netherlands. This research is part of the VF-program "Competition and Cooperation". tural products, fixed exchange rates, price indexation, and the linkage between the wages of civil servants and the wages paid in industry. The existence of price regulations and price rigidities is a frequently occurring real world phenomenon. Nguyen and Whalley [28] (p. 667) make the same observation, stating: "Price controls have been employed by governments all over the world, during war and peace, in response to all manners of threats (both real and imaginary), and in all ages" and Levy [24] (p. 157) writes: "Price controls are pervasive in developing countries."
An important reason for the existence of price regulations is that they can be used to influence the redistribution of initial endowments. As Coughlin I-4] argues, redistribution has become one of the most important political issues of the last three decades. A drawback of price regulations is the misallocation of resources resulting in efficiency losses.
In this paper a formal model capturing the ideas above is given. A stylized model of the political system corresponding with a democracy is described. The government consists of two political parties or candidates who compete for the votes of the consumers in the economy. For the sake of simplicity it is assumed that there are no producers in the economy. The political candidates have the possibility to propose price regulations in order to influence the redistribution of the initial endowments of the consumers.
The private sector will be modelled by a general equilibrium model. However, in case a political candidate proposes some regulation of the prices all the competitive equilibrium price systems might be excluded by the imposed price rigidities. Hence, an equilibrium in the classical sense cannot always be achieved. In order to obtain an equilibrium situation rationing may occur. The inclusion of price rigidities and rationing into general equilibrium models has been introduced by B~nassy [1], Dr~ze [12] , and Youn~s [32] . In this paper the equilibrium concept of Dr6ze will be used in case price regulations are proposed.
In most of the existing literature about models with price rigidities some constraints on the set of admissible price systems are exogenously given. Some exceptions worth mentioning are Hart [17], B6hm, Maskin, Polemarchakis, and Postlewaite [2], Madden [25], and Silvestre [30] . In these papers (some of the) agents in the economy are price setters on some of the markets. In this way prices are endogenously determined and may be non-Walrasian and therefore possibly involve unemployment. However, it seems to be difficult to extend the results of these papers to general cases with more than three commodities.
In the model presented in this paper political candidates may impose price regulations on the markets. Both government behaviour and price rigidities are endogenously determined. The control of prices by government is also the subject of Nguyen and Whalley [27] and Ginsburgh and van der Heyden [-14] . In these papers government behaviour and price rigidities are not endogenously determined, but the attention is focused on non-rationing mechanisms to solve the mismatch between supply and demand resulting from price regulations. This mismatch is solved by endogenously determined equilibrium
